ABSTRACT In this paper, we obtain a set of pairwise stable outcomes in two-sided hybrid matching market with price externalities. In this market, the valuation of agents depends upon money. The most important feature of our work is to devise an algorithm that characterizes the stable matchings as fixed points of an increasing function T . We also prove the termination and correctness of this fixed point algorithm. Furthermore, we study the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes by direct implication of Tarski's fixed point theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since many years matching theory has been widely studied by economists, game theorists and mathematicians due to its extensive applications in many related fields. Decisionmaking in today's world requires coordination of a group of agents, which may comprise cyber, physical or human elements. These agents naturally engage in building an opinion matching on certain resources of interest, that may include attitudes, prices, or predictions about macroeconomic variables. In social networks, interacting agents can influence each other and gradually form an opinion matching. A number of physical models have been developed to explore human opinion propagation. Hence the matching theory is the study of resource allocation among the sets of agents with respect to the preferences of these agents, so that the allocation has important implications for their well-being. Some recent relevant work in opinion dynamics includes Shang [1] and [2] in which the author presented a general model for the opinion formation in the averager-copier-voter network having non-rational agents and resilient consensus against malicious agents who deliberately change their opinions with the goal of manipulating the performance of entire network.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yilun Shang. In the present work we deal with the bipartite model and our work is based upon the application of Tarski's fixed point theorem. The study of bipartite models was originated with the work of David Gale and Lloyd Shapley. In [3] they solved the stable marriage problem for two equal and finite sets of men and women who have strict preferences over each other. Set of matchings among different men and women is a marriage scheme in this model. Such scheme is said to be stable if there does not exist a pair which is either preferring each other over their current partners or unmatched. A marriage scheme is unstable if it is not stable. Gale and Shapley [3] not only proposed the existence of a stable marriage scheme for any preference ranking of n men and n women, but they also devised a finite procedure, known as deferred acceptance algorithm(DAA) to obtain that scheme. Shapley and Shubik [4] gave another standard model named as one-to-one buyer seller model, characterized as an assignment game that clarifies the role of money. They showed the formation of non-empty complete lattice structure of stable matchings under this assignment game. Literature depicts several studies conducted on the adjuncts and variations of Gale and Shapley's marriage model and Shapley's and Shubik's assignment game.
Indivisible goods have been extensively studied with respect to the mathematical economics markets. A Gross Substitute (GS) condition was developed by Kelso and Crawford [5] through a two-sided matching model with money. With the help of this GS condition they also showed the existence of the stable matching. Above mentioned two-sided matching model is the combination of marriage model by Gale and Shapley [3] and assignment game by Shapley and Shubik [4] . Ali and Farooq [6] has observed the presence of pairwise one to one stable matching in two sided market of sellers and buyers with externalities. In their model each seller possesses at most one indivisible good and each buyer possesses a finite amount of money which is an integer variable. Their four step algorithm assigns sellers the most optimal partners and buyers has to accept their best from those sellers who proposed them. The main feature of their algorithm is that the agents are flexible i.e.; if the buyers have more than one choice and they rejected some sellers then the rejected sellers negotiate (modify) price to attract their favorite buyers. The process continues until no rejections left from the buyer's side. A limitation of their model is that it suggests the seller optimal matching only. The motivation of this work is to find more stable matchings within their model. Probably, Feder [7] and Subramanian [8] were the first one's who indicated a relationship among fixed points and stable matchings.
Let A be a set and ≤ be a relation on A, then ≤ is a partial order on A if it is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. The pair L = (A, ≤) is a lattice if every pair of two elements i, j ∈ A has a least upper bound and a greatest lower bound. L is said to be a complete lattice if every subset B of A has a least upper bound and greatest lower bound. Following theorem is due to Tarski [9] .
Theorem 1: Tarski [9] Let 1) (A, ≤) be a complete lattice, 2) f : A → A be an increasing function.
3) P be the set consists of all fixed points of f . Then, P is non-empty set and the system (P, ≤) is a complete lattice; in particular we have
Tarski's fixed point theorem is an elementary latticetheoretical fixed point theorem that holds in arbitrary complete lattices. Tarski's theorem has a wide range of applications and extensions in the theories of simply ordered sets, topology, real functions, general set theory, as well as in Boolean algebras and matching theory.
Adachi [10] studied the stable matchings in Gale and Shapley [3] behave as fixed points of certain increasing function. By using Theorem 1 they showed the lattice structure of stable matchings. For more results on lattice structure see Blair [11] and Alkan [12] . Fleiner [13] , [14] studied the lattice structure of generalized stable matchings. Farooq, Flenier and Tamura [15] studied many to many matching model with contracts. They extended model of Hatfield and Milgrom [16] . The key to their results is Theorem 1.
For more recent work also see Li [17] and Fleiner [18] . Baroon et al. [19] studied peer effects and stability in matching markets. Recently Pycia and Yemnez [20] obtained matching with externalities. Their work also observed stable matchings as fixed points but their technique is not based upon Tarski's fixed point theorem and hence no lattice structure of the matching is available. Very recently Uetake and Watanabe [21] devised an algorithm for two-sided matching model with externalities but again their work is not based on fixed point approach. Echenique and Oviedo in [22] , [23] observed stable many-one and many-many matchings as fixed points of a certain function. Their characterization presents an algorithm for finding stable assignments and the lattice structure of stable matchings. Their algorithm is named as T -algorithm which is a procedure of iterating T , starting at some pre-matching v. And it stops when Tv is a matching. They also proved the obtained matching is indeed a fixed point of T . They further discussed the lattice structure of the set of fixed points of T . But the stable matchings attained in their model only deals with the fixed preference profile with no externalities. In the present work we apply Tarski's fixed point theorem to study the lattice structure of two sided matching market with externalities i.e; the agents are flexible and can negotiate on price. We also present an algorithm that obtain the stable matching as a fixed point of an increasing function.
Throughout this paper we consider two finite and disjoint sets of same cardinality n, the set of sellers S and the set of buyers B. We state here the following important Definitions from [22] , [23] for subsequent use.
Definition 2 (Echenique and Oviedo [23] ): A strict preference relation P on the set S ∪ B is a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on S ∪ B. We denote by R the weak preference relation associated to P; so xRy if and only if x = y or xPy. It is worth noting that R defines a total order on S ∪ B.
Definition 3 (Echenique and Oviedo [22] 
represents the set of all pre-matchings v. Adachi [10] expressed ϒ S as the set of vectors in × i∈S (B ∪ {i}) and of ϒ B as that in × j∈B (S ∪ {j}).
Definition 4 (Echenique and Oviedo [22] ): A pre-matching v = (v S , v B ) is said to be a matching µ if and only if v is one to one and self invertible (v j = i if and only if j = v i ).
In the current paper we follow the idea presented by Ali and Farooq [6] and Echenique and Oviedo [22] to devise an algorithm that characterizes the set of stable matchings for VOLUME 7, 2019 hybrid model. At the end we study the lattice structure as a prompt application of Theorem 1. We also give an example to support our results. This paper is structured as follows. Section II includes our main results which we divide into following subsections: In Subsection II-A, we demonstrate the model, some basic notations and definitions. Subsection II-B involves the mathematical presentation of modified T -algorithm and its termination. The working of algorithm with the help of example is also given at the end of this section. Subsection II-C consists of lattice structure of the set of stable one-to-one matchings obtained through the hybrid algorithm. Subsection II-D incorporate conclusion.
II. MAIN RESULTS

A. SELLER-BUYER HYBRID MODEL
In this model, we consider two sets of agents. Namely, sellers (set S) that possess some commodity to sell and buyers (set B) that possess finite amount of money. Each agent can trade with at most one agent of opposite side. Also assume that the money is bounded and has a discrete/integer values. We present our model in mathematical terms as follows. For each (i, j) ∈ E, we define set of all possible seller-buyer pairs by E = S × B. We define the increasing valuations ω ij and ω ji by:
where λ ij , λ ji ∈ R + , δ ij , δ ji ∈ R and y ∈ Z. Here, ω ij (y ij ) denotes the utility to seller i if he/she trades with the buyer j and takes a price/money y ij . It means that i is always considered as a payee. The negative sign in ω ji (−y ij ) means j is always considered as a payer. Now, price vector p is defined by 1
Furthermore, for each (i, j) ∈ E. The lower and upper bounds of price are given by the two vectors π , π ∈ Z E and
In the proceeding paper, the term c ij denotes any feasible price. Definition 5: An agent is said to have a strict preference relation P if it is not indifferent among two alternatives. We say jP(i)ĵ at some y ij and y iĵ means i is strictly preferring j at price y ij toĵ at price y iĵ if ω ij (y ij ) > ω iĵ (y iĵ ). We denote it by {jP(i)ĵ} y iĵ y ij . Similarly, we define for buyers iP(j)î at some y ij and yˆi j means j is strictly preferring i at price y ij toî at price yˆi j if ω ij (−y ij ) > ωˆi j (−yˆi j ) and denote it by {iP(j)î} yˆi j y ij . Definition 6: An agent is said to have a weak preference relation R, if it is either indifferent among two alternatives 1 y = sup{n ∈ Z : y ≥ n} 2 Z E stands for integer lattice whose points are indexed by E or strictly preferring its partner. In this case, we say jR(i)ĵ at some y ij and y iĵ means i is weakly preferring j at price y ij tô j at price y iĵ if ω ij (y ij ) ≥ ω iĵ (y iĵ ) and denote it by {jR(i)ĵ} y iĵ y ij . Similarly we can define it for buyers.
Note that R is a total order on S ∪B. Also from Definition 6 we have:
Definition 7: Given a seller's strict preference relation P(i), the buyers j preferred by i to remain isolated (single) at some amount y ij are called acceptable if ω ij (y ij ) ≥ 0 for j ∈ B. This signifies that i is willing to trade with j at price y ij . We denote it as {jP(i)∅} y ij . Similarly, given a preference relation of buyer P(j), the seller i preferred by j to remain isolated (single) at some price y ij are called acceptable if ω ji (−y ij ) ≥ 0 for i ∈ S. This signifies that the seller i is acceptable to buyer j at price y ij . We denote it as {iP(j)∅} y ij .
In the Definition 7, if the strict preference relation P is replaced by weak preference relation R, then it is assume that an agent is either indifferent (i.e; an agent may prefer to remain isolated/single/unmatched) or strictly preferring its partner (i.e; an agent always prefer to be matched).
Definition 8: A 2-tuple (µ, p) is said to be pairwise stable outcome if the two conditions mentioned below are hold:
Condition (IR) says that the matching (µ, p) at a price vector p is individually rational. Condition (N .B.P) means (µ, p) is not blocked by any seller-buyer pair. A matching µ is called pairwise stable if (µ, p) is pairwise stable.
B. MATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION OF MODIFIED T-ALGORITHM
With the help of various mathematical tools and a constructive evidence, we show that the model described in Subsection II-A always depicts an existence of pairwise stable outcome. Initially, we define p ∈ Z by Eq.(3). At the start of algorithm we will exclude all those pairs that are not acceptable to each other and define a function T on the set of pre-matchings ϒ that assigns each seller a better partner. By setting any random pre-matching v = v 0 we are looking for a matching by iterative applications of T on v 0 . During this process there might be some mutually acceptable seller-buyer pairs in which seller is not matched with the buyer. For such pairs we will modify price vector. This price externality results in a new preference profile in which a matched agent may change his partner if some better potential partner appears in the preference profile. i.e; an agent on the accepting side might want to go back to a proposer that is already rejected, or an agent on the proposing side might want to withdraw a partner that already made. Throughout the procedure, we will exclude two types of unmatched pairs, if they exist. Firstly, those seller-buyer pairs in which the buyer is not acceptable to the seller and secondly, those seller-buyer pairs in which price vector becomes less than its lower bound. It is beneficial to take note that the price vector is non-increasing and the size of the set of acceptable seller-buyer pairs is non-decreasing at each step of the algorithm. As long as, the price vector is bounded and discrete and the number of agents is finite, the algorithm will terminate after a finite number of iterations and a stable outcome is achieved as a fixed point of a function T . We now state our algorithm in mathematical terms. We first define two subsets L 0 and E 0 of E that will be helpful to find a matching satisfying N .B.P as follows:
Here, L 0 consists of set of those seller-buyer pairs in which the seller is not acceptable to the buyer. Whereas, E 0 consists of the set of those seller-buyer pairs in which buyer is not acceptable to the seller. Note that, when certain agent becomes unacceptable then that agent may prefer to remain un-matched (isolated) rather than to match with an un-acceptable partner. It reveals that only acceptable partners matter, so we shall write preference relation briefly as lists of acceptable partners. Both of these two sets enables us to define the set of mutually acceptable seller-buyer pairs as follows:
Let v ∈ ϒ be a pre-matching and price vector p defined by Eq.(3). We define:
and
The set U (i, v) consists of those buyers j that prefers i at price p ij atleast as much as they prefer their partners under pre-matching v. Similarly we can define the set V (j, v). Now define a function T :
The function T has simple interpretation: Tv i means the buyer preferred by i among the buyers that are willing to make partnership with i. Whereas Tv j means the seller preferred by j among those sellers who prefer j as their partner under T . A matching µ ⊆Ẽ is then consists of matched members of Tv. So we define (q, r) (10) and
Now the 2-tuple (µ, p) obviously satisfies I .R but still N .B.P may not hold. To ensure N .B.P, we will modify price vector. Particularly, we will modify the price vector for pairs in Y defined below:
Note that Y ⊆Ẽ that consists of all those seller-buyer pairs in which buyer is most preferred by the seller but the seller is unmatched in µ. During price modification we will make sure that IR and the feasibility of p are preserved. To modify p, we find an integer η iTv i for each (i, Tv i ) ∈ Y , by 3
Now we modify the price vector p that is denoted byp. For each (i, j) ∈ E modified price vectorp is defined bỹ
A subsetẼ 0 of Y is defined by:
Before presenting the algorithm we give here the summary of important symbols for convenience of the reader. (11) and (12), respectively.
Step-II If µ = Tv implies Y = ∅ then stop(i.e T µ = µ).
Step-IIIFor each pair (i, Tv i ) ∈ Y , calculate η iTv i by Eq.(13) and findp by Eq. (15) . Define L andẼ 0 by Eqs. (14) and (16) respectively. Update E 0 by
Step-IV Put p :=p and modifyẼ by Eq.(6). Set k = k + 1. Set v k = Tv k−1 for updatedẼ and p. Find a matching µ in Tv which consists of matched members of Tv. Define r and Y by Eqs. (11) and (12) respectively. Go to Step II.
We now finally present our algorithm. Note that we can always obtain a seller optimal stable matching by taking v ∈ ϒ with
B and v j = {∅}.
For buyer optimal stable matching we have the following two cases:
Case 1 A buyer optimal stable matching can be found by taking v ∈ ϒ with v i = {∅} and v j = max R(j) S.
provided that all buyers have different optimal preference in their preference list, (see Example 14) . Hence the set of stable matchings M s contains at least two matchings and we can define a lattice structure in this case. Case 2 Unlike in Case 1, if some buyers have equally likely optimal preferences, then we cannot obtain a buyer optimal matching. Hence, in this case we claim that we always get a unique stable matching. Let ξ = {v ∈ ϒ : v = Tv} be the set of all fixed points of function T and M s be the collection of pairwise stable matchings. We show that ξ = ∅ and the above algorithm terminates.
Lemma 9: Let v be a pre-matching such that v ∈ ξ , then v is an individually rational matching.
Proof: As we are considering pairs fromẼ thus it is trivial to show v is individually rational.
∈ ξ . Now we show that v is a matching i.e v i = j ⇔ i = v j .
First suppose that j = v i then Eq.(8) implies that
we may write
and since v ∈ ξ implies that Tv j = v j thus Eq (18) gives i = Tv j = v j . Next suppose that i = v j then we shall prove that j = v i . First we note that i = v j , Eq. (7) implies that j ∈ U (i, v).
Secondly, due to v ∈ ξ note that
Since by defined condition partner of j is such kind of element whose image under T is j i.e Tv i = j this proves the result. Theorem 10: Let ξ be the set of all fixed points of T and M s be the collection of all stable matchings. Then ξ = M s .
Proof: To do this, we will first show ξ ⊆ M s and M s ⊆ ξ . Firstly, we will show v ∈ ξ ⊆ M s . By Lemma 9 we know that v is individually rational matching. We have to show that v ∈ M s means no blocking pair exists in v. On contrary assume that there exist (i, j) ∈ E, and c ij ∈ [π ij , π ij ] such that
Then by definition of
Since, v ∈ ξ so,
By Eq. (22) 
Hence we write
Eq. (20) and Eq. (23) show that there is no such pair (i, j) that blocks v. Thus
Similarly, on contrary suppose
By definition of V (j, v) from Eq. (8) implies
Since v ∈ ξ , so
This means j is preferring its partner over i that is
Therefore, we obtain
Eqs. (24) and (25) shows that there is no pair (i, j) that block v. Thus,
Let v ∈ M s and suppose that v = Tv. First we suppose that there exist i ∈ S such that
From Eq.(26)
By the definition of U (i, v) from Eq. (7) {iR(ĵ)vˆj}
Eqs. (27) and (28) imply that (i,ĵ) blocks v which contradicts that v ∈ M s . Therefore, for all i ∈ S
Similarly, suppose that there exists j such that for j ∈ B
So, by definition of V (j, v) Eq. (8) {jR ( This proves v ∈ ξ . Next, we state two Lemma's which will be helpful in the termination of algorithm.
Lemma 11 (Ali and Farooq [6] ): In each iteration of the algorithm,Ẽ remains the same or reduces. In particular, if L = ∅ orẼ 0 = ∅ at Step III thenẼ reduces at Step IV .
Lemma 12 (Ali and Farooq [6] ): In each iteration of the algorithm at Step IV , if ω ji (−c ij ) > ω jTv j (−p Tv j j ) for some (i, j) ∈ E then c ij is the maximum integer in [π ij , π ij ] for which the inequality holds.
Theorem 13: For some iteration k in the modified T -algorithm, if v k is matching, then the algorithm stops at µ = v k , and thus v k is a stable matching.
Proof: We will present the proof of this Theorem 13 as two Steps:
Step-1 First we will show that for a pre-matching
is individually rational. In order to show this, for
where µ is a matching. Suppose that algorithm terminates at
Step I i.e Tv 0 = v 1 . This implies Y = ∅ and (v 1 , p) be the 2-tuple obtained at termination where we find a matching v 1 . Initially we defineẼ by Eq.(6). Therefore
This implies
As v 1 ⊆Ẽ. The Eqs. (35) and (36) imply that v 1 is individually rational. Since in each iteration we modifyẼ by Eq.(6) at Step IV of algorithm. So, Eq.(34) holds in each iteration at Step IV by Lemma 11. Thus if µ = v k is a matching then v k ⊆Ẽ and IR hold's for all pairs at the termination of algorithm.
Step-2 For v k−1 ∈ ϒ, if v k = Tv k−1 is a matching, then the modified T-algorithm must stop at v k , and v k is a stable matching. We shall prove that, if v k−1 ∈ ϒ is a pre-matching and
We will prove this by considering the two cases:
But v k is a matching and v k = Tv k−1 by the given condition, so we have that for
By transitive property, Eqs.(37) and (39) imply that,
and by given condition
Eqs. (38) and (40) (42)
But v k is a matching, v k = Tv k−1 , so we have that
. This implies by Eq.(8)
By transitive property, Eqs. (43) and (44) imply that, . and by given condition, for j ∈ B, v k j = Tv
Eqs. (42) and (45) implies that the T -algorithm stops at µ = v k . Thus this proves Theorem 13.
Theorem 10 shows that the stable matching is a fixed point of T and Theorem 13 shows the termination of the algorithm.
Example 14:
We consider two finite and disjoint sets S = {i 0 , i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } and B = {j 0 , j 1 , j 2 , j 3 } where S denote the set of sellers and B denote the set of buyers. The set of all possible seller-buyer pair is given by E = S × B. Define the lower and upper bounds for all (i, j) ∈ E as follows:
We assume valuations given by Eq. (2), where λ ij , λ ji , δ ij , and δ ji for each (i, j) ∈ E are given as follows:
We begin from the Step I of the algorithm. We find price vector
and ω ji (−π ij ) < 0 for (i, j) ∈ {(i 1 , j 3 ), (i 3 , j 0 )}. Therefore, we have p = (−1, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, −1, 0, 0, 2) . Using the values given in Tables (1) - (4) and price vector p from Eq.(3), we get ω ij (p ij ) and ω ji (−p ij ) from Eq.(2) for each (i, j) ∈ E as follows in Tables 5 and 6: By Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we have L 0 = {(i 3 , j 0 )} and E 0 = {(i 1 , j 3 )}. By Eq. (6), we obtain the set of mutually acceptable seller-buyer pairs which is given by:
(Here we will consider the two different pre-matchings to get the two extreme(optimal) matchings of hybrid model). Consider a pre-matching
and define µ which consists of matched member of
We find r by Eq.(11) and get: Step IV, we modifyẼ by Eq.(6). As both L andẼ 0 are empty, it implies thatẼ remains unchanged.
We find r by Eq. (11) and get:
By Eq. (12) 
Since Y = ∅. Our algorithm terminates at this point and matching µ = {(i 0 , j 3 ), (i 1 , j 0 ), (i 2 , j 1 ), (i 3 , j 2 )} is a pairwise seller optimal matching. VOLUME 7, 2019 
D. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a hybrid model to the theory of stable matchings. This model designed with the help of modified T -Algorithm and it differs from the two existing models presented in [6] and [22] in the following way:
1) The modified T -Algorithm not only gives the seller optimal stable matching as obtained by Ali and Farooq [6] but because of the fact that it starts with any random pre-matching, more than one stable matchings can be achieved including the buyer and the seller optimal matchings. Moreover, these stable matchings can be characterized as fixed points of T and hence forms a complete lattice.
2) The modified T -Algorithm is better than T -algorithm by Echenique and Oviedo [22] because this hybrid algorithm involves flexible agents and price externalities (modification) unlike T -algorithm that involves no price negotiation. 
